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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Labor Law-Fre-Hearing Discovery of Employees' Statements
The principle of full disclosure through discovery has, at least since
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,1 become
fully entrenched in litigation conducted in federal and most state courts.
It has not, however, become an established principle in proceedings before
the National Labor Relations Board although the Board's adjudicative
hearings closely resemble court litigation2 to which discovery has been
so usefully applied. This fact appears on its face somewhat difficult
to justify. The expressed rationale for discovery in civil adjudications-
that it minimizes "gamesmanship" and surprise, identifies and simplifies
the issues, and tends in the long run to expedite the adjudicative process-
seems also applicable to Board hearings. As Professor Davis has stated
in his treatise on administrative law, "[p] robably no sound reason can be
given for failure to extend to administrative adjudications the discovery
procedures worked out for judicial proceedings."8
In the recent case of NLRB v. Schill Steel Products, Inc.,4 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed itself to this important ques-
tion of discovery prior to labor hearings on petition of the Board to
adjudge Schill Steel in civil contempt for failure to comply with a
cease and desist order.' The company acquiesced in the Board's motion
that a special master be appointed to hear contempt proceedings, but
moved for a specific provision in the order that would allow discovery
of all statements taken by the Board in the course of its investigation
from witnesses whose testimony the Board intended to adduce at the
contempt hearing. The court rejected the Board's argument that such
discovery could lead to undue intimidation of witnesses by the employer
and held the statements subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Noting that under the Board's own rules, statements
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
2An adjudicatory hearing is similar to a trial; the parties present evidence,
subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, before a tribunal which makes a deter-
mination of fact and law. 1 K. DAvis, ADMiNIsTRATivE LAw § 7.01 (1958).
'Id. § 8.15, at 589.
408 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1969).
'The Fifth Circuit had previously handed down a decree on February 2, 1965,
enforcing the Board's orders of February 8, 1963, and August 20, 1963, that the
company cease and desist from certain named violations of sections 8(a) (1),
8(a) (3), and 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. In the principal case,
the Board, alleging that the company had failed to comply with the court's decree,
petitioned the court to adjudge the company in civil contempt.
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of such witnesses were to be turned over anyway after they testified,6
the court concluded that discovery at the pre-hearing stage would not lead
to greater coercion7
The decision in Schill dramatizes the split between the federal courts
and the Board on the issue of pre-hearing discovery of employee state-
ments. The federal courts for several years have consistently recognized
the right to such discovery in original proceedings in federal court. For
example in a 1962 case, Fusco v. Richard W. Kasse Baking Co.,' the
Board's regional director filed a petition seeking to have certain unfair
labor practices enjoined. The respondent served on the regional director
a subpoena calling for him to testify and produce certain affidavits, reports,
and memoranda. The regional director declined to produce the material.
The court held that the discovery provisions of the federal rules were
applicable, but limited discovery to affidavits and statements of those
employees who were to appear as witnesses for the petitioner.' The
court in Fusco, and other federal courts'" since that decision, reasoned
that although the action is brought by an official governmental agency,
the agency is in no different position than any ordinary litigant and is
therefore bound by the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Contrary to the practice in the federal courts, the Board has consistent-
ly refused to allow any pre-hearing discovery in Board proceedings'"
despite repeated attempts by respondents to gain discovery privileges.
In view of the current trend of full disclosure in civil actions and in light
of the Schill decision, a re-examination of Board policy denying discovery
seems imperative. The focus will be on discovery of statements of wit-
nesses whom the Board plans to call for testimony at the hearing. Since
the investigation of unfair labor practices centers around such statements,
the contents, if discoverable, would be most beneficial to the respondent
in preparing its defense.
0 See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
408 F.2d at 805.
8205 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ohio 1962).0 Id. at 464.
" See, e.g., Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers Local 537, 334 F.2d 391 (10th Cir.
1964); Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961); Madden v. Milk
Wagon Drivers Local 753, 229 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Fusco v. Richard
W. Kasse Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
" See, e.g., Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 296 (1960);
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 128 N.L.R.B. 398, 400 (1960); Sealtest S.
Dairies, 126 N.L.R.B. 1223 n.3 (1960); Chambers Mfg. Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 721,
722 (1959).
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CURRENT BOARD PRACTICE
The rules and regulations of the Board expressly forbid any formal
discovery of a witness' statements or the information contained in those
statements without consent of the Board itself. This policy is reflected in
Board regulation 102.118:
No . . . employee of the Board shall produce or present any files,
documents, reports, memoranda, or records of the Board or testify
in behalf of any party to any cause... with respect to any informa-
tion, facts, or other matter coming to his knowledge, in his official
capacity or with respect to the contents of any files, documents, re-
ports, memoranda, or records of the Board ...without the written
consent of the Board .... 12
Nor does the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 which provides statutory
guidelines of the rules of evidence and procedure to be followed by the
various federal agencies, contain any provisions for discovery in the
administrative adjudicative process.
Employers have, of course, attempted informal means of discovery
to ascertain what employees have told the Board. But informal dis-
covery may be subject to strictly enforced limitations. For example, in
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.,'4 the Board held "that the Respondent's requests
[to his employees] for copies of the employees' statements to the General
Counsel constitute interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning
of section 8(a) (1) of the [National Labor Relations] Act."'" In fact,
it is immaterial whether the statements are actually handed over. The
request itself is a violation."8
However, the Board has been more tolerant of employer interrogation
of employees.
[An employer is privileged to interview employees for the purpose
of discovering facts within the limits of the issues raised by a complaint,
where the employer or its counsel, does so for the purpose of preparing
its case for trial and does not go beyond the necessities of such prep-
aration to pry into matters of union membership, to discuss the nature
or extent of union activity, to dissuade employees from joining or re-
12 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(a) (1969).
185 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
143 N.L.R.B. 848 (1963), enforced, 341 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965).
1 Id. at 850.
'" Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1964).
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maining members of a union, or otherwise to interfere with the
statutory right to self-organization. 17
This ruling strikes a delicate balance between the legitimate interest of
the employer in preparing its case for trial and the interest of the em-
ployee in being free from unwarranted interrogation-a balance that an
employer risks upsetting each time he questions an employee. In Joy
Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB"8 the court recognized this danger:
Apparently this rule means that an employer may question his
employees in preparation for a hearing but is restricted to questions
relevant to the charges of unfair labor practice and of sufficient pro-
bative value to justify the risk of intimidation which interrogation as
to union matters necessarily entails; and that even such questions may
not be asked where there is purposeful intimidation of employees.
Such a standard assumes that interrogation of employees concerning
their union activities is, of itself, coercive, but that fairness to the
employer requires that a limited amount of such questioning be per-
mitted despite the possible restraint which may result. 9
The privilege is a narrow one, and "[a] ny interrogation by the employer
relating to union matters presents an ever present danger of coercing
employees in violation of their § 7 rights."2 Undoubtedly, such limita-
tions are justified. Moreover, if formal pre-hearing discovery of witness
statements were allowed, the justification for employer interrogation-a
type of informal discovery with hazards to all involved-would be
practically eliminated.
While denying discovery to others, the Board through its investi-
gative powers has the ability to ascertain facts relevant to a controversy
well before the hearing stage. This power is derived from section 11 (1)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, which provides that
[t]he Board or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all
reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and
the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or
proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in
question.2 '
'7 May Dep't Stores Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 94, 95 (1946).
18 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
'Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
.'Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
-
1Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 11(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 161(1) (1964).
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Such broad investigative powers have been strongly criticized by Pro-
fessor Davis in his treatise on administrative law;22 nevertheless, they
insure that the Board will be well prepared in advance of the hearing.23
ATTACKS ON BOARD POLICY
Attempts to assert discovery privileges in Board proceedings have
met with little success. For example, section 102.118(a) of the Board's
rules2' was attacked as a denial of due process in NLRB v. Vapor Blast
Manufacturing Co.25 However, the court held that the rules of the Board
restricting examination of documents did not deny procedural due
process and that the Board had responsibility "to formulate its own rules
for unfair practice hearings and to determine whether full discovery is
practicable in such hearings. 20
Other attempts to gain discovery have been based on section 10(b)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act, the last sentence of which
provides that unfair labor practice hearings shall "be conducted in ac-
cordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of
the United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district
courts of the United States ... ."' The Board's position is that this
provision "clearly relates to evidence before the Board, and not to pretrial
privileges accorded parties to judicial proceedings."2 " This interpretation
has also received judicial endorsement.2"
The frustration experienced by parties to a Board proceeding is
exhibited by the fact that in at least one instance an attempt at dis-
covery has been made under the recently passed Public Information Act,80
22 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATV LAw § 3.01, at 160 (1958).
" For an analysis of the scope of administrative investigative powers see id.
§§3.01-.14 (1958).
2'See 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(a) (1969), supra note 12, and text immediately
preceding.
" 287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961).
26 287 F.2d at 407.
"'Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1964).28 Del. E. Webb Constr. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 377 n.2 (1951).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir.
1961); Raser Tanning Co. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d 80, 83 (6th Cir. 1960).
805 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III, 1965-67). Subsection (a) (3) states in pertinent
part:
Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1)
and (2) of this subsection, each agency, on request for identifiable records
made in accordance with published rules ... shall make the records promptly
available to any persons.
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which has as its purpose the making of government records more readily
accessible to the public for inspection. In the first reported opinion 1'
under the Act, plaintiff employer brought suit to prevent withholding by
the Board of certain documents consisting of witnesses' statements. The
court denied the requested disclosure on the ground that the material came
under the Act's exemption immunizing investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes. 2
Because of the courts' unqualified refusal to find any statutory or
constitutional basis for the claim that discovery should be granted, it is
not surprising that the Board has evinced considerable antipathy to such
disclosure. One attack on the Board's rules in this general area, how-
ever, has been successful although it met with stiff opposition from the
Board.
The attack was based on Jenwks v. United States,8 a criminal case
in which the defendant Jencks was prosecuted for filing a false non-
Communist affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board. Two
F.B.I. informers were crucial government witnesses. Jencks sought an
order requiring the Government to produce for inspection the reports re-
lating to those matters about which each informer had testified. The
trial court denied the order, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that once a witness has testified, a
defendant is entitled to an order directing the government to produce for
inspection by the defendant any reports made by the witness touching the
events and activities to which he gave testimony."' Since under Jencks
the statements are to be turned over to the defendant only after the witness
has testified, the net effect of the holding is to provide the defendant a
source for impeachment of the witness.
Relying upon the rule derived from Jencks, the respondent in Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.35 sought the production of all documents that
might be relevant and material to the cross-examination of a hearing wit-
ness. The contention that regulations barring such disclosure had been
abrogated by Jencks was rejected by the Board, which held that the
decision should not operate to overturn statutes authorizing agencies to
adopt rules reasonably calculated to maintain their records inviolate.3 6
" Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D. Puerto Rico
1967).
s, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (Supp. III, 1965-67).
S353 U.S. 657 (1957).
' Id. at 668.
S118 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1957).
Id. at 1282.
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Subsequently the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit in NLRB v.
Adhesive Products Corp.37 considered the same question and on the
authority of Jencks reversed the district court, which had denied produc-
tion under the Board rule forbidding disclosure. 8 In the wake of the
Second Circuit's decision, the Board in Ra-Rich Manufacturing Corp.80
held that Jencks applied to its proceedings and thereby overruled its
position in Great Atlantic & Pactific Tea Co. Thus, for purposes of
cross-examination the Board affords parties the right to production of
pre-hearing statements made by witnesses who have already testified to
matters contained in those statements.4°
Nevertheless, the Jencks rule as applied to hearings before the Board
cannot be regarded as a substitute for discovery; it becomes operative
only after the hearings have begun and one or more witnesses have testi-
fied. The chief utility of the rule remains co-extensive with its original
purpose-to provide a respondent with a source of material upon which
to impeach a witness. Though of indisputable value, this right to obtain
witnesses' statements serves a purpose essentially distinct from the privi-
lege of becoming apprised of an opposing party's information before
adjudication in order to eliminate needless issues and prepare an effective
defense.
NEED FOR DISCOVERY IN 8(a) (3) PROCEEDINGS
A look at discovery against the background of one particular type of
Board proceeding may be enlightening. Section 8(a) (3) makes any dis-
criminatory treatment for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging
union membership an unfair labor practice. 1 Charges under this provision
make up the great bulk of Board cases against employers. In 1967 there
"1258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958).
38 Id. at 408.
"0 121 N.L.R.B. 700 (1958).
40 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b)(1) (1969), as pertinent, reads:
[A]fter a witness called by the general counsel or by the charging
party has testified in a hearing upon a complaint under section 10(c) of the
act, the trial examiner shall, upon motion of the respondent, order the
production of any statement . . . of such witness in the possession of the
general counsel which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness
has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the sub-
ject matter of the testimony of the witness, the trial examiner shall order
it to be delivered directly to the respondent for his examination and use
for the purpose of cross-examination.




were 7,463 charges of discrimination-sixty-six per cent of the total
filings against employers.'
The key to sustaining a discrimination charge lies in the government's
ability to prove that the motive behind the employer's action was to
encourage or discourage union activity. In the typical proceeding the
government is fairly assured of a prima facie case of discrimination if it
can prove the following questions of fact: (1) that the employee was a
union member or adherent; (2) that the employer knew this fact; (3)
that the employer was anti-union; and (4) that the employee was treated
unlike non-union employees. For example, in a typical discrimination
case, the trial examiner's analysis of the government's case reads in
pertinent part as follows:
There is no doubt that Allen was quite an active union adherent,
and after the visit of Allen, McKinney, and Walker to Snipes' office
on September 25 there can be no question about Snipes' knowledge
of this fact. It has previously been found that the Respondent was
vigorously opposed to the Union's advent. The timing of Allen's
discharge within a few hours after Snipes became aware of Allen's
prounion sympathies is therefore suspect.43
Of course additional factors, if present, are also introduced by the govern-
ment to strengthen its case. It can fairly be said that the Board is quite
liberal in permitting inferences to be drawn from these surrounding cir-
cumstances.44
In discrimination cases under section 8(a) (3) the Board pays lip
service to the proposition that the burden of proof is on the government;
however, because of the relative ease with which inference is allowed,
the burden of going forward appears to shift to the employer to show
good cause for his actions." Undoubtedly the burden should be on the
"NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT,
Table 2, at 218 (1967).
"Wellington Mill Div. West Point Mfg. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 819, 835 (1963),
modified, 330 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
"See Miller Elec. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1959);
NLRB v. Blue Bell, Inc., 219 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Indiana Metal Prod.
Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613, 616 (7th Cir. 1953); Interlake Iron Corp. v.
NLRB, 131 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 119
F.2d 356, 363 (7th Cir. 1941).
"' Jasper Nat'l. Mattress Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 75, 77-78 (1950). The Board stated
that after the government had established its prima facie case, "[i]t... devolved
upon the Respondent to come forward with reasonably convincing evidence to
show that the discharges were actually for nondiscriminatory reasons." Other
Board decisions have stated this proposition more explicitly. See, e.g., Pacific
1970]
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employer since the reasons for his actions are peculiarly within his knowl-
edge. However, once saddled with this burden, the question then becomes
whether it should often be made intolerable by denying the employer
discovery privileges. Such a situation is particularly disturbing because
overt acts of the kind that are a part of everyday business management
are laid open to inferences that may sustain the charge. As it stands
now, prior to the hearing the respondent has no idea on which of his
acts or conversations the government will base its case or introduce
for the drawing of inferences. The employer is in a very unenviable
position. He does not know to what facts his proof must be responsive;
therefore, he often cannot adequately prepare a defense. In view of the
large number of discrimination cases-about two of every three charges
against employers heard by the Board-discovery would appear to be
justified by this type of proceeding alone.
OBJECTIONS TO DIsCOVERY
Although witness statements have never been subject to discovery
in Board proceedings, it is conceivable that should they in the future be
held discoverable, the Board could protect them under the work product
doctrine. This doctrine excludes from discovery such items as a lawyer's
own notes and memoranda or anything else reflecting his mental im-
pressions, theories, or conclusions, including statements that he has
taken from witnesses. Although the work product doctrine was formu-
lated in civil cases, it would seem applicable to administrative hearings
that are basically adversary. The policies behind the work product rule
are based on the adversary process. 46
The leading case involving the work product doctrine is Hickman v.
Taylor,47 in which witnesses' statements were protected from discovery.
The basis for the Court's holding was that the plaintiff had made no
showing of necessity for the discovery. The Court stated that the peti-
tioner "has sought discovery as of right of oral and written statements
of witnesses whose identity is well known and whose availability to
petitioner appears unimpaired."4 After pointing out the numerous other
means available to petitioner to obtain the information sought, the Court
Mills, 91 N.L.R.B. 60, 61 (1950), where the Board held that "the burden of
going forward with evidence after the prima facie case of discriminatory char-
acter of discharge had been established necessarily falls upon the Respondent."
"
8See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
'"329 U.S. 495 (1947).
'8 Id. at 508.
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concluded that he was attempting "to secure the production of written
statements . . .without any showing of necessity or any indication or
claim that denial of such production would unduly prejudice the prepara-
tion of petitioner's case or cause him any hardship or injustice."4
There is, of course, no firm rule to use in determining the necessity
that must be shown for discovery of work product. However, Professor
Wright in his analysis of the case states that "[u]ndoubtedly the single
most important factor in measuring necessity or justification for discovery
of work product materials is whether the information in question is other-
wise available to the party seeking discovery." ° The courts, in effect,
should balance the competing interests of the parties involved. The court
in Hickman found that there was equal opportunity on the part of both
parties to prepare for trial.
Applying the above reasoning to an unfair labor practice proceeding,
discovery seems strongly justified; there are no alternative effective
means of discovery available to an employer. A great disparity exists
between the respective abilities of the parties involved as far as prepara-
tion for the hearing is concerned. Detailed information of alleged unfair
labor practices is to be found only from employees, to whom the employer's
access is severely restricted by Board decisions. Thus it appears that
the federal courts could find the requisite necessity for discovery. The
Court in Hickman intimated as much by stating that "production might
be justified where the witnesses are no longer available or can be reached
only with difficulty.""1 Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion
reiterated the position of the Court:
There might be circumstances, too, where impossibility or difficulty
of access to the witness or his refusal to respond to requests for in-
formation or other facts would show that the interest of justice require
that such statements be made available.52
In sum, it is unlikely that the work product rule would impair dis-
covery of witnesses' statements in a Board proceeding. Furthermore,
the need for ascertaining the truth seemingly outweighs any harm result-
ing from work product disclosure.
Thus far, the Board has sucessfully based its denial of discovery rights
Id. at 509.C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 82, at 317 (1963).
329 U.S. at 511.52Id. at 519.
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on a more pragmatic objection than assertion of the work product rule.
A Board investigation is unique in that most of the statements taken
during its course are obtained from employees-a fact distinguishing
Board adjudicatory proceedings from civil cases in a way significantly
related to the appropriateness of discovery. There is a seemingly genuine
fear by the Board that if discovery of witnesses' statements were allowed
beforehand, such disclosure could lead to undue intimidation by the
employer.53
The point is well taken that an employee who is asked to cooperate
with the Board by giving a statement to its investigator is in a particularly
delicate situation. Indeed, the real danger of granting discovery appears
to be the prohibitive effect on an employee's willingness to give state-
ments; the employee may choose to remain silent, and the Board's ability
to conduct effective investigations would become more difficult. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Texas Industries, Inc. v. NLRB 4
remarked that
[I]t would seem axiomatic that if an employee knows his statements
to Board agents will be freely discoverable by his employer, he will be
less candid in his disclosures. The employee will be understandably
reluctant to reveal information prejudicial to his employer when the
employer can easily find out that he has done so.15
While such a rationale seems perfectly valid, the risk of such dis-
closure and its prohibitive effect appear to be present under current
Board procedure. Under the Jencks rule, a witness' statement is avail-
able to the respondent after the witness has testified. Thus, if discovery
were allowed only of statements of witnesses whom the Board planned
to have testify at the hearing, it would follow that the prohibitive effect
would be no greater than under the Jencks rule. The Fifth Circuit
took this view in Schill to reject the Board's argument that discovery
would lead to intimidation. The court stated that it was "unable to see how
the danger of coercion or reprisal becomes greater if we require that the
statements to the Board of witnesses who testify be turned over at the
discovery stage rather than during the course of the hearing.""0 This
reasoning also appears valid in proceedings before the Board.
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Schill Steel Prod., Inc., 408 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1969).
' 336 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1964).5 Id. at 134.
ra 408 F.2d at 805.
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STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS AGAINST INTIMIDATION
AND A PROPOSAL
Some protection against intimidation is provided employees by statu-
tory prohibitions. Pertinent is section 8 (a) (4) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this Act."sr It is not unreason-
able to believe that the great majority of employers who have been charged
with an unfair labor practice will not subject themselves to a second
such charge by discriminating against an employee who files charges or
makes statements to the Board. But undoubtedly there are a handful
who would continue to resist the provisions of the Act at any cost. The
Board's concern in this area reveals a lack of faith in the remedy of
section 8(a) (4) provided for such an occurrence. Perhaps there is good
cause for the Board's concern; since coercion is in itself a separate un-
fair labor practice, it calls for a separate proceeding against the employer.
Consequently, if an employee is fired for filing charges with the Board,
it may be quite some time before his rights are asserted in court,
especially if appeals are taken.
A practical solution to the problem would be to provide an immediate
means of relief to an employee who feels that he has been prejudiced
under section 8(a) (4). Such relief could be made available by sec-
tion 10(l) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, which provides
that immediate injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order may
be granted for certain unfair labor practice charges." Amendment of
17 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (4), 29 U.S.C.
§158(a)(4) (1964).
"0Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(1) (1964) reads in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (A), (B), or (C) of section
8(b), or section 8(e) or section 8(b) (7), the preliminary investigation of
such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases
except cases of like character in the office where it is filed, or to which it is
referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to
whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such
charge is true and that a complaint should be issued, he shall on behalf
of the Board, petition any district court of the United States ... within any
district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged
to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for
appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board
with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary
1970]
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this section to include section 8(a) (4) in the list of unfair labor prac-
tices for which injunctive relief is available would be a big step in
providing the employee with more protection against coercion by his
employer. Such a strengthening of the remedy against intimidation
would complement adoption of pre-hearing discovery of employees' state-
ments.
CONCLUSION
It seems anomalous that discovery of employees' statements to the
Board is allowed in original proceedings in federal court but not for
hearings before the Board itself. Since the main argument by the
Board against discovery is fear of employer intimidation, the solution
would appear to be a strengthening of the remedy against such intimida-
tion to complement the adoption of discovery procedures.
On April 13, 1961, the Administrative Conference of the United
States was established by executive order to consider administrative law
problems and make recommendations. The Conference officially endorsed
discovery in Recommendation No. 30 in 1963: "The Conference approves
the principle of discovery in adjudicatory proceedings and recommends
that each agency adopt rules providing for discovery to the extent and
in the manner appropriate to its proceedings.""9 Over five years have
passed and the Board has not yet acted on this recommendation. It is
obvious, therefore, that if a change is to be made, it must come about
through amendment of the National Labor Relations Act by Congress.
Hopefully such action will be forthcoming.
F. FiNc = JARRELL
Military Law-Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial To Try Servicemen for
Civilian Offenses
Since the days of the Continental Army, the question of how much
judicial authority should be vested in the military has been the subject of
continuing debate. The Constitution gave Congress the power "[t]o
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other
provision of law.
1 Recommendation No. 30 of the 1963 Administrative Conference of the United
States, quoted in Fuchs, The Administrative Conference of the United States, 15
AD. L. REv. 6, 45 (1963).
[Vol. ,48
